Religion

Religious Freedom at the Supreme Court in Five Cases

From Reynolds in 1879 to Lukumi in 1993: belief and action, compelling interests and neutral laws.

Etalia.ai
Sep 15, 2025
4 min read
SCOTUS, AI-Rewritten, AI-Model-claude-opus-5-5

Five Supreme Court decisions, from 1879 to 1993, show how the Court has treated claims that a law burdens religion. The test has moved from belief versus action, to a demand that the State show a compelling interest, to a rule that neutral laws of general applicability need no exemption.

Belief and action

Reynolds v. United States (1879), decided January 6, 1879. Reynolds was convicted of bigamy in the Territory of Utah under section 5352 of the Revised Statutes. He proved that he was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and that it was an accepted doctrine of the church "that it was the duty of male members of said church, circumstances permitting, to practise polygamy." Chief Justice Waite, for the Court, affirmed the conviction. Congress "was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." To rule otherwise "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."

A compelling interest

Sherbert v. Verner (1963), decided June 17, 1963. Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. She could not find other work that did not require Saturday work, and the State denied her unemployment benefits because she had failed to accept suitable work. Justice Brennan, for the Court, reversed. To condition benefits "upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." The Court found no compelling state interest in the eligibility provisions that justified the burden.

The Amish and school

Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), decided May 15, 1972. Members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law, which requires attendance until age 16, by not sending their children to school after the eighth grade. The evidence showed that the Amish give their children informal vocational education to prepare them for life in the rural Amish community. Chief Justice Burger, for the Court, held that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16." Enforcing the requirement after the eighth grade, he wrote, "would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs."

Neutral laws

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), decided April 17, 1990. Smith and Black were fired by a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church. Oregon denied them unemployment compensation under a state law that disqualifies employees discharged for work-related misconduct. Justice Scalia, for the Court, held that the denial did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. "We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Oregon could exempt sacramental peyote use from its drug laws, but the First Amendment did not require it to. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.

Laws aimed at a religion

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993), decided June 11, 1993. The church and its congregants practice Santeria, which uses animal sacrifice as one of its principal forms of devotion. After the church leased land in Hialeah and announced plans for a house of worship, the city council held an emergency public session and passed a resolution and several ordinances aimed at animal sacrifice. The District Court ruled for the city, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in the parts quoted here, and reversed. Applying Smith, he wrote that a law that is not neutral or not generally applicable must meet the most rigorous scrutiny, and that government, "in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief." The Court held the ordinances void.

What the five decisions show

Reynolds drew the line between belief, which is free, and action, which the law may reach. Sherbert and Yoder required the State to show a compelling interest when a general rule burdened religious practice. Smith held that a neutral law of general applicability need not meet that test, and Lukumi held that a law aimed at a religion must. This post covers five decisions, and it does not cover the Court's later religion cases.

Sources

Updated November 2026.


This post was rewritten with AI (Claude) and reviewed by an editor before publication.

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